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ARTICLE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
HOW JURORS FAIL TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY
W. Kip Vlscusr*
Evidence of corporate risk-cost balancing often leads to inefficient pu-
nitive damages awards, suggesting that jurors fail to base their decision-
making on principles of economic efficiency. In this Article, Professor Viscusi
presents the results of two experiments regarding jury behavior and punitive
damages. In the first experiment, Professor Viscusi found that mock jurors
punish companies for balancing risk against cost, although award levels vary
depending on how the economic analysis is presented at trial. The results of
the second experiment suggested that mock jurors are unwilling or unable to
follow a set of model jury instructions designed to generate efficient damages
awards. Professor Viscusi concludes that neither risk-cost analysis nor this
particular set of instructions can encourage jurors to behave efficiently. As a
result, damages awards may create undesirable incentives for companies
making choices about safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
The challenges associated with determining punitive damages loom
among the greatest difficulties juries face in our civil justice system.' It is
well known that juries may fail in some respects. The more interesting
issue is whether jury performance can be improved, or whether jury fail-
ings can be eliminated altogether.
What do we mean by juror performance being a success or failure?
Three different reference points will be used in this Article. The first and
most rigorous reference point is that punitive damages should be efficiency-
enhancing. Jurors should set levels of punitive damages so as to create
efficient incentives for deterring reckless behavior. Firms consequently
should have financial incentives to take the appropriate degree of care
and manufacture sufficiently safe products.
* John . Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. This re-
search was supported by the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund; the Olin Center for Law,
Economics and Business at Harvard Law School; and a grant to the author from the Exxon
Corporation.
I For an analysis of jurors' inability to translate their outrage into dollar awards, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). Punitive damages'
failure to produce beneficial safety effects is the focus of W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No
Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEo. L.J. 381 (1998). See also W. Kip Viscusi, The So-
cial Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts,
87 GEo. L.J. 285 (1998).
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A second test is more limited. Suppose one does not accept eco-
nomic efficiency as the goal of punitive damages. Nevertheless, firms
should be punished less for greater efforts to promote safety. The more a
firm invests in safety, the more unlikely it is that the firm should be
judged reckless for displaying a conscious disregard for safety. Holding
constant other aspects of the firm's behavior, as the level of investment in
safety increases, the frequency and level of punitive damages should fall.
The third and final test is still more limited. Do jurors properly im-
plement formal instructions when setting punitive damages levels?
Wholly apart from broader law and economics norms, do jurors adhere to
specific instructions from the judge telling them how to make efficient
awards?'
Unfortunately, jury damages awards tend to discourage safe corpo-
rate behavior by punishing careful decision-making, even when jurors
have been explicitly instructed to act efficiently. This Article examines
two efforts directed at improving jury performance in balancing risk and
cost and in adhering to jury instructions. The first set of results pertains
to jury judgments of recklessness when a defendant company performed
a risk-cost analysis.3 Mock jurors considered case scenarios and were
asked to assess whether the company's behavior was reckless and war-
ranted punitive damages. Ideally, companies should undertake systematic
risk analyses to achieve the appropriate balance of risk and cost in their
decision-making.4 In fact, corporate risk analyses have been associated
with many of the most prominent punitive damages awards, particularly
with respect to the automobile industry.' This suggests that jurors inter-
pret risk-cost analyses as worthy of punishment rather than as praise-
worthy efforts to improve safety. Part III of this Article explores how dif-
ferent case contexts affect the likelihood and level of punitive damages.
Building on results from an earlier series of experiments, I found that
jurors fail to make efficient punitive damages awards and are vulnerable
to dollar values that are suggested as anchor values at trial.6
2 Whether punitive damages should be set by a judge or eliminated for many classes of
cases involves judgments beyond the scope of this paper.
I In the usual policy analysis case, there is a benefit-cost comparison. Preventive steps
are taken if the value of the benefit exceeds the costs of attaining that benefit. For policy
choices involving risk, the benefit is risk reduction, leading to a tradeoff between risk re-
duction and cost, or a risk-cost tradeoff.
4 The approach I take here is the standard policy analysis perspective. See W. Kip Vis-
CUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC & PRIvATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 4-6 (1992)
[hereinafter Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS]. Judge Frank Easterbrook describes the desirabil-
ity of corporations using their expertise to make safety decisions in Carroll v. Otis Eleva-
tor Co., 896 F2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990).
'See, e.g., Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 R Supp. 2d 548 (D.S.C. 1999), vacated by
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22562 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2001); General Motors Corp. v. Moseley,
447 S.E.2d 302, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
6 The results of the initial series of experiments were published in W. Kip Viscusi,
Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547, 553 (2000) [hereinafter
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis]. Additional analysis of the results may be found in Ja-
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Part IV presents the results of a study on the effectiveness of jury in-
structions developed by Polinsky and Shavell in an effort to ground the
determination of punitive damages in sound law and economics princi-
ples.7 Typical punitive damages instructions ask jurors to determine
whether the defendant's conduct was reckless, i.e., whether the defendant
was conscious of grave danger, whether that risk eventuated, whether the
defendant disregarded the risk, and whether the defendant's conduct was
a gross deviation from the level of care an ordinary person would select.
8
If these criteria are met, the jury may award punitive damages to punish
and deter the defendant. Armed with the Polinsky-Shavell instructions,
however, the determination of punitive damages should be a straightfor-
ward mathematical exercise involving little more than simple multiplica-
tion and addition.9 By reducing the task of setting punitive damages to
the implementation of a formula, the Polinsky-Shavell approach ideally
should eliminate the random element of punitive damages and ground
them in important principles of efficiency.10 In practice, the instructions
do not appear to improve the efficiency of damages awards.
My assessment of juror reactions to corporate risk analyses and to
the Polinsky-Shavell punitive damages instructions was based on con-
trolled experimental results involving hundreds of jury-eligible citizens.
The experimental findings do not bode well for the possibility of reme-
dying perceived inadequacies in jury performance. Jurors do not seem
receptive to risk-cost balancing and also fail to implement the guidance
offered by the Polinsky-Shavell formulas. Jurors are vulnerable to sug-
gestions made at trial regarding appropriate awards, even when they have
been directed to use a different method for determining damages. Fur-
thermore, the damages awards made in the studies penalized companies
that made efficient decisions about risk. It appears that instead of deter-
ring risky conduct, damages often discourage companies from taking
efficient steps to make their operations safer.
rors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 119-27
(2001) [hereinafter Viscusi, Jurors].
7 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analy-
sis, Il IIHARV. L. REv. 869, 957-62 (1998). Results from this study also are analyzed in
W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313
(2001) [hereinafter Viscusi, Challenge of Punitive Damages]
8 See Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 527-31 (Del. 1987).
9 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 7, at 960-62 for their formula for setting punitive
damages for firms.
10 While Polinsky and Shavell stress the importance of the formula in providing "guid-
ance" to jurors with respect to punitive damages levels, as a practical matter the variability
of awards should be reduced as well. See id. at 954-56. For example, the calculation of the
deterrence value of punitive damages has only one correct answer for any particular case.
If jurors follow the formula, then their damages awards should not vary from this figure.
See id. at 960-61.
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II. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE RISK ANALYSES"
In order for businesses to make efficient decisions about safety, risk-
cost balancing must be an explicit concern of corporate risk decision-
making. Such balancing lies at the heart of standard negligence tests,
particularly those that are framed within the context of a law and eco-
nomics approach, such as the Learned Hand rule. 2 Risk-cost tradeoffs
are central to the commonly used risk-utility test for assessing liability,
which balances a product's usefulness and safety characteristics to de-
termine whether the company has attained the correct balance of cost and
risk."
Similarly, risk-cost tradeoffs play a central role in government regu-
latory policy in the risk and environmental area, because a regulation's
stringency is reflected in the cost expended by regulated companies per
life saved.' 4 For any given regulatory policy, it is usually the case that the
costs of the regulation become increasingly greater as the regulation is
tightened. 5 These tradeoffs are incurred as the government seeks to in-
duce regulated industries to achieve desired levels of safety.'6 It should be
noted, however, that the decision-making processes of regulators and ju-
ries are not identical. The government sets regulatory levels and busi-
nesses set care levels in anticipation of a certain number of future acci-
dents. At the time the lifesaving decisions are made, the potential victims
who would be the beneficiaries of additional safety precautions generally
are not known. In contrast, juries consider accident cases in which there
is an identified victim. Jurors may find it difficult to evaluate the busi-
ness's conduct from an ex ante perspective once there is a specific, hu-
man victim in addition to a statistical probability of harm.' 7
" The discussion in Part II draws extensively on Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, su-
pra note 6, at 548-52, 567-78. For additional analysis, see Viscusi, Jurors, supra note 6, at
117-18.
12 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42
(2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179-83 (5th ed. 1998).
The Learned Hand formula parallels the risk-cost tradeoff in cost-benefit analysis. A firm
is negligent if the cost of the precaution is less than the probability of an accident multi-
plied by the size of the loss incurred when the accident does occur. See POSNER at 180.
11 See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 837-38 (1973); W. Kip VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 70-81 (1991). I
discuss this issue in greater detail in Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 6, at
549.
14 See VISCUSi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 4, at 4-6.
"See W. Kip VIscusI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 114-15 (1983). Justice Breyer refers to the escalation of costs as regulations
are tightened as "the problem of the last 10 percent." In other words, such stringent regu-
lations impose "high costs without achieving additional safety benefits." See STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-19
(1993).
16 See BREYER, supra note 15, at 9-10. For a more detailed discussion, see Viscusi,
Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 6, at 561-62.
17 See Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Because of the central role played by risk-cost tradeoffs in attaining
desired levels of care, a recent preliminary draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts explicitly recognized the importance of undertaking such
an analysis as well as the fact that doing an analysis in and of itself
should not be a basis for finding negligence:
Under § 4, negligence is defined in terms of the failure to exer-
cise reasonable care, and reasonable care is explained primarily
in terms of the balance between the magnitude of the foresee-
able risk and the burden of precautions that can eliminate the
risk. If the burden is greater than the risk, the actor who declines
to adopt that precaution is not negligent. But if the magnitude of
the risk is somewhat greater than the burden, the actor is negli-
gent for failing to adopt the precaution.
From this evaluation, two points follow that relate to the mean-
ing of recklessness. The first point is a negative one: the fact
that the actor, because of the burden entailed by a particular
precaution, has made a deliberate choice to omit a precaution
and hence to tolerate a risk by no means signifies that the person
has behaved recklessly. Indeed, the fact that such a choice has
been made does not even show that the actor has behaved negli-
gently. Rather, the actor is negligent only for making an unwise
choice. In a sense, the very objective of negligence law is to en-
courage actors to acknowledge and confront such choices, and
to render these choices wisely rather than unwisely.18
The practical experience with corporate risk analysis has not fol-
lowed the Restatement guidelines, and plaintiffs often use the fact that
the defendant conducted a risk analysis to infer that behavior was negli-
gent or reckless. Indeed, as the discussion below explains, the analysis in
and of itself can become a source of controversy and lead jurors to im-
pose punitive sanctions on the company.19
In some cases, these corporate risk analyses occur after the fact, as
the company attempts to determine the causes of a major accident. After
airplane crashes, for example, companies should make a frank and criti-
cal assessment of the causes so as to prevent such accidents in the fu-
ture.0 Because jurors respond to these analyses by awarding higher dam-
' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. d (Discussion Draft 1999).
19 Perhaps the most noteworthy instance was a General Motors case involving burn
victims in a rear-ended Chevrolet Malibu, which will be discussed in detail below. See
infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
20 For a discussion of the tensions involved with post-crash investigations, see Donald
S. Skupsky, Legal Requirements for Records Prepared for Internal Investigations and
Audits, REc. MGMT. Q., Apr. 1992, at 34-36. I discuss the same issue in greater detail in
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 6, at 567-68.
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ages, an investigation may jeopardize the company's prospects in court
when the families of the accident victims seek compensation.2 Defen-
dants also may be concerned that a truly critical report could trigger pu-
nitive damages.2 2 As a result, the frankness and thoroughness of the re-
port could be compromised if the company were forced to release its own
assessment of the accident.
Risk analysis following airline crashes was a central issue in the le-
gal battle involving the 1979 American Airlines DC-10 crash near
O'Hare Airport.' American Airlines had undertaken a detailed post-crash
investigation, but later destroyed the report, claiming that it was covered
by attorney-client privilege.24 The court suggested that the failure to re-
lease the report did not necessarily imply that the report itself would have
been damaging.25 Nonetheless, one can speculate that American Airlines'
decision to destroy the report may have been influenced by fear that ju-
rors would view the analysis in a negative light.
An airline must make a difficult decision after a plane crash.2 6 If it
chooses not to undertake an accident investigation, surely that would be a
sign of recklessness. The accident gave the company knowledge of a risk,
and the company has a duty to investigate and determine how to reduce
that risk in the future.2 1 Undertaking some kind of post-accident assess-
ment certainly would appear to be the more desirable course for pre-
venting future harm.28 Nonetheless, when the company realizes the puni-
tive damages consequences of making such an analysis, it may choose to
either forgo a thorough investigation or keep any resulting report secret.
In situations in which the corporate risk analysis occurs before the
accident, the very act of undertaking the analysis often becomes a nega-
tive feature rather than a positive one in jury determinations of punitive
damages.29 Suppose the company makes a detailed risk assessment and
then proceeds with a level of safety that is efficient, but that does not re-
sult in zero risk. Jurors often view the risk analysis as a negative aspect
of corporate behavior, reasoning that the company knew of a way to
make the product safer, but chose instead to endanger its customers.2 0
21 See Skupsky, supra note 20, at 34-36.
22 See id.
21 See In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
24 See id.
2See id. at 621.
26 This discussion draws extensively on Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note
6, at 567.
27 See id. Following any accident, one can analyze whether human or mechanical fail-
ure were contributory factors and whether changes in either would have affected the likeli-
hood of an accident.
28 See Skupsky, supra note 20, at 34.
2 9The cases discussed below will document this relationship. See infra notes 31-41
and accompanying text.
30 Id.
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A noteworthy case was that brought against General Motors
("G.M.") in Los Angeles, in which a Chevrolet Malibu was rear-ended on
Christmas Eve, 1993. The driver, her four children, and a friend of the
family were riding in the car, and all were seriously burned as a result of
the accident.3' During the trial, a memo by G.M. engineer Edward Ivey
played a critical role leading to the $4.8 billion punitive damages
award.32 That memo analyzed the costs of fuel-fed, fire-related fatalities
in cars and the costs of preventing these deaths. 33 Ivey valued fatalities at
$200,000 each, which is the same value that Ford used in its analysis of
risks associated with the Ford Pinto.' The Pinto analysis had used a
number that paralleled the level of compensatory damages awards in fa-
tality cases, which can be traced to the present value of lost earnings due
to the accident .3 This value was consistent with punitive damages awards
in product-related fatality cases during that time period. 36
Whether such an amount would be an appropriate yardstick to use
when valuing life from the standpoint of preventing deaths in automobile
crashes is more problematic. Two factors should be considered: the value
from the standpoint of prevention, and the value from the standpoint of
compensation. 37 In terms of preventing accidents, the appropriate eco-
nomic measure is the value of a statistical life, or the risk-money tradeoff
involving small risks.38 For compensation purposes, looking at the in-
come loss may be a reasonable measure of damages, but it will under-
state how much it is worth to prevent the death. People value their lives
at more than their income level and they generally are not willing to ac-
cept certain death in return for compensation for future income loss. 39
Ivey's memo did not pursue these issues, but did conclude on a caution-
ary note:
This analysis indicates that for G.M. it would be worth ap-
proximately $2.20 per new model auto to prevent a fuel fed fire
31 For a description of this case, see Andrew Pollack, Paper Trail Haunts GM After it
Loses hjury Suit: An Old Memo Hinted at the Price of Safety, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1999,
at A12; Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in GM Fuel Tank Case: Penalty High-
lights Cracks in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A8 [hereinafter Pollack, Jury
Verdict]; Ann W. O'Neill et al., GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash Verdict Liability,
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at Al.
32 See Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 31, at A8.33 Memorandum from E. C. Ivey, to General Motors, Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed
Fire Related Fatalities (June 29, 1973). Also see my earlier discussion of the Ivey memo-
randum in Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 6, at 574-76.
3 See VIscusI, REFORMING PRODucTS LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 111. For further
discussion of the Pinto case, see infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.35 See VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 111.36 See id.
37 See W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses of Hedonic Values of Life, 13(2) J.
FORENSIC ECON. 111 (2000) [hereinafter Viscusi, Misuses].38 See id. at 112.39 See Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 4, at 39-40.
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in all accidents .... This analysis must be tempered with two
thoughts. First, it is really impossible to put a value on human
life. This analysis tried to do so in an objective manner but a
human fatality is really beyond value, subjectively. Secondly, it
is impossible to design an automobile where fuel fed fires can
be prevented in all accidents unless the automobile has a non-
flammable fuel.40
Was undertaking such an engineering analysis viewed as an honest
attempt at risk-cost balancing? The attorney representing the plaintiffs
argued just the opposite, claiming that this analysis showed that G.M.
was "caught red-handed."'" The company was aware of the risk and the
potential for reducing it, yet proceeded with the original design. After the
trial, one of the lawyers for the plaintiff observed that the large punitive
damages award was, in effect, a critique of this approach to examining
risk-cost tradeoffs: "The jurors wanted to send a message to General
Motors that human life is more important than profits."4 Jurors likewise
highlighted the corporate risk analysis as significant in the decision-
making process: "Jurors told reporters that they felt the company had
valued life too lightly. 'We're just like numbers I feel, to them,' one juror,
Carl Vangelisti, told Reuters. 'Statistics. That's something that is
wrong."' 43 These comments suggest that the large award reflected the ju-
rors' belief that the very act of performing a risk-cost analysis merited
punitive damages.
There are several ways for jurors to infer from a risk-cost analysis
that punitive damages should be awarded. By conducting an analysis, the
company demonstrates awareness of the risk. If it chooses not to adopt
the safety measure, it will have demonstrated willingness to proceed with
a design knowing that it would cost lives. The very act of undertaking an
analysis may appear cold-hearted, and making an explicit tradeoff of
lives for money may appear to be a gross deviation from proper care. At
the time of the analysis, the tradeoff is between expensive across-the-
board safety measures and a small expected loss to any particular indi-
vidual. After an accident, the comparison is between a modest safety in-
vestment that would have prevented the specific fatality and an
identifiable life, a trade-off that jurors may find reckless.
40 Ivey, supra note 33 (emphasis added). Ivey's suggestion that it is impossible to ob-
tain zero risk may run counter to jurors' intuition. From an efficiency perspective, however.
the relevant issue is not whether the risk of the current design is greater than zero, but
whether the risk of the current design is desirable when compared against the costs of risk
reduction.
41 Jury Awards $4.9 Billion to Crash Victims, Finds GM Bargained Away Passenger
Safety, PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP., July 16, 1999, at 721.
4_ Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 31, at A8.
4
1 Id.
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In many respects, the experience with the Ivey analysis paralleled
the earlier press treatment of the Ford analysis relating to the Pinto."
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company45 focused on the safety aspects of the
design of the Pinto and, in particular, the placement of the gas tank in the
rear of the vehicle. 46 What was particularly noteworthy about Grimshaw,
which led to a $125 million punitive damages award that was subse-
quently reduced to $3.5 million, was the role of corporate risk analysis in
the media coverage of the case.47 Mother Jones magazine published an
article documenting that a Ford engineer had done a safety analysis on
the Pinto assessing the benefits and costs of preventing fire-related
deaths.48 This article was released at a press conference featuring Ralph
Nader and led to the awarding of a Pulitzer Prize to the magazine.49
Ford's analysis was construed by Mother Jones as pertaining to the Pinto
rear impact risks.50 Although Ford was criticized for having analyzed the
risks associated with rear-end impact fires, the document at issue was in
fact an economic analysis prepared for the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration in opposition to a proposed regulation regarding
fires associated with rollover risks.51
Similar issues arose with respect to the Chrysler minivan case, in
which a six year-old, Sergio Jimenez, was thrown from the vehicle after
his mother ran a red light and the minivan was struck on its side.5 2 This
case, which led to a $250 million punitive damages award against the
Chrysler Corporation, was noteworthy in that the company had under-
taken a post-accident analysis of the cost of fixing the allegedly defective
rear-door latch that opened when the minivan rolled over after being hit
44 See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18.
4- 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
46 This case also receives extensive analysis in Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra
note 6, at 568-70.
47 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013,
1020-21 (1991).
48 See Dowie, supra note 44, at 18.
49 See STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 357 (1980).
50 See Dowie, supra note 44, at 24.5 1 See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1020-21 & n.21. This mismatch between the Mother
Jones report and Grimshaw is a central theme in Schwartz's article. See also BRENT FISSE
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 54 (1983),
observing:
In the absence of an offense defined in terms of manufacturing an unjustifiably
dangerous product, questions of acceptable risk of the kind raised by the Pinto
Papers will rarely be the central subject of inquiry in the context of corporate of-
fenses against the person. This is unsatisfactory, not only because of the danger of
a serious underlying risk being concealed from society, but also because it may do
more harm than good not to face up to the need for studies of the costs of im-
proving product safety in matters such as that for which Ford was pilloried.
52 See Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D.S.C. 1999), vacated by 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 22562 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2001). See also Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analy-
sis, supra note 6, at 551.
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on the side.53 The analysis concluded that the design did not pose a
significant risk and that it would have cost $100,000 in fixed retooling
costs as well as an additional $0.50 per vehicle to change the latch de-
sign.54 After the trial, the plaintiff's attorney observed that "Chrysler
officials at the highest level cold-bloodedly calculated that acknowledg-
ing the problem and fixing it would be more expensive, in terms of bad
publicity and lost sales, than concealing the defect and litigating the
wrongful death suits that inevitably would result." 55
The 1984 case of Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield56 involved a Ford
Mustang II that caught fire after a rear impact. 7 The fire killed Terri
Stubblefield, the passenger riding in the rear seat of the car. The jury
awarded $8 million in punitive damages. The plaintiff's argument re-
ferred to a risk analysis undertaken by Ford and criticized the company
for engaging in "safety science management": 8
The evidence here was sufficient to authorize the jury to find
that the sum of $8 million was an amount necessary to deter
Ford from repeating its conduct; that is, its conscious decision
to defer implementation of safety devices in order to protect its
profits. One internal memo estimated that "the total financial ef-
fect of the Fuel System Integrity program [would] reduce Com-
pany profits over the 1973-1976 cycle by $(109) million," and
recommended that Ford "defer adoption of the [safety measures]
on all affected cars until 1976 to realize a design cost savings of
$20.9 million compared to 1974." Another Ford document re-
ferred to a $2 million cost differential as "marginal."5 9
The difficulties encountered by Ford with respect to its engineering
risk analyses have not been limited to rear impact cases. In Miles v. Ford
Motor Co.,60 the company came under fire for its risk analysis done with
respect to tension eliminator spools for lap belts. 6' In this particular case,
the passenger, Willie Miles, leaned over to pick up some trash from the
floor of the car, causing the shoulder harness to spool out and leaving a
13 See Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
11 See Donald C. Dilworth, Jurors Punish Chr'sler for Hiding Deadly Defect, TRIAL,
Feb. 1998, at 14, 16.
s1 Id. at 14.
56319 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
11 For additional analysis of this case, see Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note
6, at 572-73.
56319 S.E.2d at 475.
59 ld. at 481.
60922 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1996), remanded for procedural errors to Ford Motor
Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998).
61 This case also is discussed in Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis. supra note 6, at
572-73.
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slack.62 The tension eliminator spool did not rewind the belt.63 The car
was involved in a collision, and Miles slid through his lapbelt, catching
his head and sustaining spinal injuries.64
Once again, the fact that Ford had conducted an analysis of this class
of issues proved to be consequential in the arguments at trial.6 Indeed,
not only had Ford explored the issue, but it had undertaken an economic
cost-benefit analysis. 66 Although such an analysis is necessary to achieve
an efficient result, Ford's caution was presented in a negative light in
court:
Syson [the plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert] testified
that he was familiar, during the relevant time period, with the
corporate policies of Ford Motor Company as they related to
potentially defective products. Syson testified that when Ford
identified what it believed was a defective product it would first
run a "cost benefit" analysis to see what the cost would be to fix
or repair the defect. Next, Ford would assign arbitrary values to
each death or serious injury and would predict the number of
occurrences which would involve either death or serious injury.
Finally, Ford would determine the cost to litigate such deaths
and injuries. Syson testified that if the cost to repair the defect
exceeded the other costs, Ford would not correct the defect.67
As described here, the procedure undertaken by Ford has all the
earmarks of a standard economic analysis. In particular, the decision
came down to an explicit comparison of the benefits of risk reduction and
costs. 68 The task from a cost-benefit standpoint is to assess the cost of the
safety improvement and to compare these costs to the benefits. 69 The
benefits equal the expected number of injuries or deaths, multiplied by a
dollar valuation of the adverse health outcomes. This also is the approach
taken in the Learned Hand negligence formula. Although there can be
disagreement regarding the dollar values attached to the benefit levels,
the overall steps in the analysis are not controversial and follow standard
economic blueprints for risk analysis. The valuation amounts are not,
however, ideal, and I will examine their influence in the empirical study.
These examples illustrate my hypothesis that as a practical matter,
once the accident has taken place, the jury may compare the small costs
62 922 S.W.2d at 579.
6 Id.641d.
6 Id. at 588-89.
6 Id.
67Id.
63 For an overview of how economists conduct cost-benefit analyses, see EDITH STO-
KEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134-58 (1978).
69 Id.; see also VIscusl, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 4, at 4-6.
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associated with fixing an automobile with the catastrophic injury to the
victim and find that they are not commensurable. The difficulty is that
jurors are often unable to conceive of the pre-accident situation, where
the tradeoff is not between the small cost of a design change to one vehi-
cle and an identified life, but rather between costs of the design change
across an entire model and a statistical expectation of possible fatalities
that is based on engineering models rather than concrete evidence. The
failure of jurors to view the accident from the situation of the company
beforehand is a reflection of the more general phenomenon of hindsight
bias. In effect, jurors may use the information conveyed by an accident in
judging behavior as if they knew all along that a particular activity was
risky, even though this had not been evident before the accident oc-
curred.70
The issue that I will examine below using experimental evidence is
whether risk analyses can be presented to jurors in a way that will make
them better understand the importance of risk-cost tradeoffs. In doing so,
I will examine not only different kinds of analyses the company might
undertake but also different ways in which these analyses might be posi-
tioned within the context of litigation. Do jurors respond to the economic
soundness of the analysis? Do they respond to the contextual setting of
the analysis?
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS
To better understand how jurors respond to risk analysis evidence, I
undertook a series of experiments involving jury-eligible citizens. Sub-
jects for these experiments were recruited by a survey research firm. The
test site used was Phoenix, Arizona for the first five scenarios consid-
ered.7 I also examine additional, new results based on a sample from
Austin, Texas.7 2 In each instance, the samples were broadly representative
of the adult population and were similar in terms of attributes such as
educational background. Because the scenarios presented were identical
except for the controlled manipulations, one would not expect different
results because of the difference in locales.
The study participants were divided into different groups, each of
which considered one case scenario involving an automobile accident.
The scenarios differed in terms of whether the company performed an
1o See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on
Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & Hot. BEHAv. 597 (1999).
7'The results for Scenarios 1 through 5 are discussed in Viscusi, Corporate Risk
Analysis, supra note 6, at 552-559. Additional statistical analysis appears in Viscusi, Ju-
rors, supra note 6, at 115-27.7 2The reason two survey waves were run was that the initial survey results indicated
widespread resistance to corporate risk analysis. The sequel was intended to explore
whether such biases could be reduced.
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analysis, the character of the analysis, and other analysis-related aspects
of the case. By making comparisons across different subject groups that
considered different scenarios, it was possible to see whether juror ac-
ceptance of risk-cost studies could be increased by changing the charac-
ter of the analysis or pertinent facts of the case. Other aspects of the sce-
narios were held constant in order to isolate the effects of these
influences.
The basic case scenario, Scenario 1, involved an automobile com-
pany that manufactured cars. The defective vehicles resulted in a number
of burn deaths:73
A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a
line of cars with a defective electrical system design. This fail-
ure has led to a series of fires in these vehicles that caused 4
burn deaths per year. Changing the design to prevent these
deaths would cost $16 million for the 40,000 vehicles affected
per year. This safety design change would raise the price of cars
$400 each. The company thought that there might be some risk
from the current design, but did not believe that it would be
significant. The company notes that even with these injuries, the
vehicle had one of the best safety records in its class.
The courts have awarded each of the victims' families $800,000
in damages to compensate them for the income loss and pain
and suffering that resulted. After these lawsuits, the company
altered future designs to eliminate the problem.
Thus in Scenario 1, the company did not conduct a risk-cost analy-
sis. In Scenario 2, the company also failed to perform an analysis, but the
cost per life saved was only $1 million. This information can be found in
Table 1, which summarizes the seven different scenarios. In Scenario 2,
the company could have prevented the deaths at a cost of $1 million each.
The other scenarios had the higher cost per life saved of $4 million. At
this higher cost, it becomes more difficult for the company to prevent the
burn deaths. As a consequence, juries that are trying to attain an efficient
result should be less likely to find fault with the company's safety deci-
sion.
Unlike Scenarios 1 and 2, Scenarios 3 through 7 all involved the
company undertaking a risk analysis that compared the benefits and costs
73 Some scenarios were run with a different number of deaths, but responses were not
sensitive to this manipulation. The total lives lost took on values of 4 and 10. Apparently,
this range of the number of deaths was not sufficiently great to affect respondents' assess-
ments given the other aspects of the scenario. There were no statistically significant differ-
ences in the responses to the scenarios when the number of deaths was 10 rather than 4.
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of the safety improvement. The risk analysis for Scenario 3 used the
value of compensatory awards as the reference point:
The company did a detailed analysis of the risk and estimated
that 4 people would die each year. However, the company esti-
mated that the liability cost would only be $800,000 per death
based on the median award all industries pay for product-related
fatalities. The company's estimate of the total court awards for
the design problem was $3.2 million per year. As a result, the
company estimated that the $4 million annual cost of making
the change exceeded the estimated value of the court awards.
The company concluded that it was cheaper not to adopt the
safer design. The company notes that even with these injuries,
the vehicle had one of the best safety records in its class.
For Scenario 4, the basis for valuing expected lives lost was the value of
a statistical life used by the government:
The company did a detailed analysis of the risk and estimated
that 4 people would die on average per year. However, the cost
to eliminate the risk was $4 million per fatality prevented. To
determine whether the safety improvement was worthwhile, the
company used a value of $3 million per accidental death, which
is the value used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration in setting auto safety standards. The company esti-
mated that the annual safety benefits of the safer design would
be $12 million (4 expected deaths at $3 million per death),
while the costs would be $16 million. As a result, the company
believed that other safety improvements might save more lives
at less cost. The company notes that even with these injuries,
the vehicle had one of the best safety records in its class.
In each instance, the company presented with these figures realized that
the costs exceeded the benefits, and as a consequence, chose not to make
the safety improvement.
The risk-cost analysis in Scenario 3 valued the benefits of saving
lives in the same manner as the various analyses undertaken by Ford and
General Motors.74 It used the value of compensatory damages for fatali-
ties, which was set at $800,000. This particular figure was selected as a
measure of the present value of the decedent's lost earnings, less the de-
cedent's consumption share, plus compensation for pain and suffering.75
14 See supra notes 31-36, 44-51 and accompanying text.
71 For example, if wage growth is at the rate of interest, then a person earning $40,000
per year for an additional twenty years would earn a total of $800,000. If pain and suffer-
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The company found that the added safety costs of $4 million per life ex-
ceeded these expected court awards. As a consequence, the company
chose not to make the safety investment.
Using the value of court awards as a proxy for the benefits from lives
saved has superficial appeal, particularly if one's focus is solely on the
expected consequences in the judicial system. In particular, if past judi-
cial outcomes provide a reliable measure of other companies' prospects
in court, then a company assessing the prospective legal costs of danger-
ous products could use this value as a cost measure. It should be kept in
mind, however, that this index ignores whatever value consumers attach
to avoiding risks even if they expect that a well-functioning legal system
will compensate them fully for their losses. In addition, the value of the
compensatory award based on income loss alone surely will not compen-
sate for non-pecuniary losses due to death or serious disability, because
people value their own lives by more than the value of their income.76
Furthermore, the compensatory amount does not reflect the full
value that potential victims place on preventing risks to life.77 The court
awards reflect compensation for the family of the deceased that is in-
tended to meet some of the income losses resulting from the death. 7
From the standpoint of proper design of automobiles, the appropriate
question is not what the company must pay out to compensate the survi-
vors, but rather how valuable it is to the prospective accident victims to
reduce the risks of death to themselves. 79 In particular, what i s their
willingness to pay for reduced risk, where this translates into a value of a
statistical life that is generally substantially greater than the present value
of lost earnings? For example, if people are willing to pay $300 to avoid
a risk of 1/10,000, the value of the statistical life is $3 million, even
though compensatory damages to a particular victim likely would fall
below this figure.
To capture the higher, willing-to-pay value, the risk analysis in Sce-
nario 4 used a $3 million value of life rather than the $800,000 value in
Scenario 3. The $3 million figure was comparable to the highest values
ing compensation equals the deduction for the decedent's consumption, then the total com-
pensatory award would be $800,000.
76 See surpa note 39 and accompanying text.
77 The discussion below draws on Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 4, at 17-23,
and Viscusr, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 45-68 (1998).
78 See Viscusi, Misuses, supra note 37, at 116-17.
79 This willingness-to-pay principle is a basic component of benefit-cost frameworks.
See Stokey & Zeckhauser, supra note 68. Indeed, the United States Office of Management
and Budget recommends this approach for regulations throughout the federal government.
See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1992-MAR. 31, 1993 634 (1992). The Bush administration
indicated that the same guidelines that were pertinent from 1992 through 1993 (Exec. Or-
der No. 12,866, 50 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993)) would be implemented under the cur-
rent administration. See Memorandum from John D. Graham, to the President's Manage-
ment Council, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA (Sept. 20, 2001).
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used by the United States Department of Transportation. 0 Moreover, the
scenario stated that in adopting this value and in carrying out the analy-
sis, the company followed the same procedure used by the United States
government when setting automobile safety regulations. In this instance,
the benefit value for saving lives was $3 million per life, and the cost per
expected life saved was $4 million, so that on an efficiency basis it still
was not worthwhile to adopt the safety improvement." Because the com-
pany concluded that the annual benefits of $30 million would be less than
the annual costs of $40 million, it chose not to make the safety improve-
ment.
The next series of scenarios focused on how the company used the
analysis. Scenarios 5 through 7 involved situations in which the company
conducted the risk analysis as in Scenario 4, and the costs and benefits
were the same as in Scenario 4. In Scenario 5, the company made a mis-
calculation and failed to realize that the benefits of risk reduction ex-
ceeded the costs.
The company estimated that the safety benefits of the safer de-
sign would be $6 million (2 expected deaths at $3 million per
death), while the costs would be $8 million. As a result, the
company did not adopt a safer design since it believed that other
safety improvements might save more lives at less cost. If, how-
ever, the company had assessed the risk accurately, the benefits
of the safer design would have been $12 million, which exceeds
the costs of the design change. The company notes that even
with these injuries, the vehicle had one of the best safety rec-
ords in its class.
If the company had not made this error, it would have fixed the car design
defect because it would have realized that this was the efficient course of
action. In Scenario 5, the company erred in concluding that improve-
ments in safety were not warranted, whereas in Scenario 4 the company
correctly concluded that the changes were not warranted on an efficiency
basis.
Scenario 6 focused on the degree to which the company actually
used the analysis in designing the automobile. In this scenario, the analy-
sis was undertaken by a staff engineer, but the company claimed that the
analysis did not play any role in the design of the car.
" See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Inplementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. L. STUDIES 1105 app. at 1146 (2000).
' The point of view I advocate is that prospective lives saved should be given the
value of a statistical life derived from people's willingness to pay for risk reduction. Thus.
it is the values determined by the beneficiaries of the government policy that should count.
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The study indicated that other safety improvements might save
more lives at less cost. The company said it never used the study
in the design of the vehicle. It was an analysis by a staff engi-
neer that did not play any role in the design decision.
This could occur in a large enterprise if the analyst was working in a di-
vision not responsible for the automobile design, or if the analysis ap-
peared in a memorandum by a low-level employee that simply never
made it to the corporate decision-makers. The question posed by this
scenario was whether the fact that the analysis took place at all would
influence juror behavior, as opposed to the situation where the company
actually incorporated the analysis in its decision-making process. It
should be noted that even if jurors are told that the company did not use
the analysis in designing the car, they may not find this claim credible.
Jurors might hypothesize that the company is attempting to minimize the
role of the analysis for fear that jurors might penalize the company if
they knew that it had based its decision to forego the safety improvement
on risk-cost tradeoff considerations.
In an actual case situation, one would expect the company to mount
an aggressive defense explaining why it conducted the analysis.12 Sce-
nario 7 examined whether the company could deflect some of the criti-
cism of risk analyses by emphasizing the constructive role that such
studies play. In Scenario 7, the respondents were told that the company
had undertaken other such risk analyses in the past. These analyses had
led to many major safety improvements in cars, but this particular
modification did not pass muster on a risk-cost basis.
The company had undertaken a series of similar risk analyses
for other safety measures. These studies led to improved struc-
tural reinforcements in the doors, stability controls, and other
improvements. But in this instance the company concluded that
the extra costs to consumers were too great in comparison to the
safety benefits. The company chose instead to make other de-
sign changes that might save more lives at less cost. The com-
pany notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle had one of
the best safety records in its class.
The issue to be explored in this scenario was whether detailed articula-
tion of the rationale underlying corporate risk analysis could reduce juror
resistance to accepting the approach's legitimacy.
82This hypothesis is based on the apparent importance of analysis in influencing jury
decisions. A responsible defense attorney presumably would attempt to explain the ration-
ale for the analysis and how it played a constructive role in corporate decisions rather than
accept the existence of an analysis as indicating that the firm displayed a reckless disregard
for life.
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Table 2 presents the results of respondents' assessments of the dif-
ferent scenarios. Each respondent considered only one of the seven sce-
narios. The number of respondents ranged from 96 for Scenario 5 to 104
for Scenario 6, or roughly 100 subjects each. Overall, 695 jury-eligible
adults participated in the experiments.
In each case, respondents considered the corporate risk analysis sce-
nario as well as other questions pertaining to their risk beliefs and atti-
tudes. Focusing on the detailed written scenario description is, of course,
a more limited exposure to a case than would occur in a trial context.
Because this aspect of the study was common across all scenarios, any
effect should be consistent across the results and only the differing as-
pects of the case descriptions should influence juror decisions. Actual
trial experiences would provide a less effective experimental structure
because differences in attorney presentation or other "live" factors would
make it impossible to isolate the effects of the variables being studied.
The first question facing respondents after reading the scenario was
whether they would award punitive damages. Each case scenario indi-
cated that compensatory damages already had been awarded to the plain-
tiff. For the first two scenarios, in which no analysis was undertaken, the
percentage awarding punitive damages was 85% for Scenario 1 and 92%
for Scenario 2, a difference that was not statistically significant.
The appropriate reference point for judging the subsequent scenarios
will continue to be how they differed from Scenario 1 as described
above. Scenarios 3 through 7 each paralleled Scenario 1 in that the cost
per life saved was $4 million, while they differed in terms of whether a
risk analysis was undertaken and if so. what it entailed. The results for
Scenarios 3, 4, and 5 with respect to whether punitive damages were
awarded ranged from 93% to 95%, levels similar to the figures for Sce-
narios I and 2. It is noteworthy that when, in Scenario 6, the company
did not use the analysis as part of its corporate decision-making, the per-
cent favoring punitive damages dropped to 89%. Although this 89%
figure still exceeds the 85% who would have awarded punitive damages
for Scenario 1, the difference is not statistically significant. Remember
that Scenario 1 was identical to Scenario 6, except that in the former, the
company did no analysis whatsoever. This suggests that jurors cannot
differentiate between the situation where a company disregards its risk
analysis, and the situation where the company does not conduct a risk
analysis at all.
Perhaps the most interesting results are those for Scenario 7, which
suggest that it may be possible to communicate the usefulness of risk
analysis to jurors. In that scenario, the percent favoring punitive damages
dropped to 76%, which was the lowest for any scenario and was 9% be-
low the value for Scenario 1.
What is striking about all of these results is that they indicate a very
high willingness to impose punitive damages. When an automobile had a
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known defect and the company chose not to repair the car, jurors had a
substantial willingness to impose punitive damages irrespective of
whether the safety measure had been subjected to a rigorous economic
analysis. In fact, undertaking an analysis justifying the decision tended to
slightly increase the percentage of jurors awarding punitive damages.
The exception was Scenario 7, in which a very strong effort was made to
convey the fact that such risk analyses had led to substantial safety im-
provements in the past. Irrespective of the different variations in the
cases, at least three-fourths of all respondents favored punitive damages.
When companies feasibly could have reduced known risks for a fairly
reasonable cost, the respondents generally viewed the failure to do so as
reckless behavior.
Whereas there was not a great deal of difference in the frequency
with which the jury-eligible citizens awarded punitive damages for the
different scenarios, the levels of the awards exhibited more variation. The
last two columns of Table 2 provide information on the geometric mean
and the median award for the different scenarios."' The first two scenar-
ios-in which no analysis was performed at all-had similar results with
respect to the award level: roughly $3 million for the geometric mean and
$1 million for the median award. Underlying modest differences in the
cost of promoting safety seem to have little effect on the level of punitive
damages awards. In contrast, undertaking a risk analysis using an
$800,000 value of life as in Scenario 3 boosted the geometric mean
award to $4 million and the median award to $3.5 million. Thus, the risk
analysis led to higher levels of punitive damages awards.
What happened when the company conducted its analysis with the
$3 million value of life used by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration to evaluate the effectiveness of regulations? The results
for Scenario 4 indicate that doing so did not dampen jurors' concerns
with the analysis, but rather increased both the geometric mean award
level and the median award level, with the median reaching a high value
of $10 million. It therefore appears that rather than making risk analyses
more acceptable to jurors, use of a high value of life that reflects greater
concern for safety on the part of the company serves as an anchor that
boosts jury awards to a higher level.' Often in punitive damages con-
texts, jury verdicts are influenced by the desire to send the defendant
company a message."5 In order to encourage companies to change their
8 The median values are more representative and less distorted by outliers than the
mean award levels. If, for example, a respondent were awarded $1 billion in punitive dam-
ages, that amount would greatly influence the average across all respondents and would
distort a measure of how the typical juror would perform. The median is also the measure
of how the critical individual in a majority rule context would value the damages, which
also may be important as a prediction of jury behavior.
84 For similar conclusions based on analysis of Scenarios 1 through 5, see Viscusi,
Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 6, at 558-59.
85 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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policies, respondents may have reasoned that they had to assess a higher
punitive damages value than the amount warranted by the value of life
that the corporation used in its own decision-making. Otherwise, they
would not be sending the company a message that the risk-cost analysis
had undervalued human life. The high anchor value also may make jurors
more reluctant to see the company make a sensitive tradeoff between risk
to life and costs.
The results for Scenario 5, in which the company overestimated the
costs, were similar to those for Scenario 4. From an economic standpoint,
the company was actually more remiss in Scenario 5 than in Scenario 4
because the safety improvements in Scenario 5 were efficient on an eco-
nomic basis. Nevertheless, there seems to be no evidence that the jurors
want to punish the company for these errors in the cost estimates. There
was no apparent effect on the frequency of punitive damages awards that
could be traced to this difference. Rather, the jurors awarded damages
similar to those awarded when the company took the efficient course of
action. The jurors also awarded damages with similar frequency.
The final two scenarios directed at ameliorating the jurors' concerns
each appeared to be somewhat successful in diminishing the damages
awards. If the company did not in fact use the analysis in its automobile
design, the geometric mean award dropped to $2.5 million, and the me-
dian award was $3 million. These results were similar in character to the
results for the no-analysis Scenario 1. The difference between the two
was that in Scenario 6, the company actually conducted a risk analysis,
although that analysis never entered the decision-making process. Inter-
estingly, the median award in Scenario 6 is above the median award in
Scenarios 1 and 2, so it appears that doing an analysis that is not used
affects the distribution of punitive damages awards adversely when com-
pared against not doing an analysis at all.
Scenario 7 represented the attempt to decrease the punitive sanctions
by elaborating on the constructive role that other analyses had played in
car design decisions. This led to somewhat lower values for the geomet-
ric mean award than any of the other scenarios, as well as a median
award level of $1 million that equaled those for Scenarios 1 and 2. It
therefore appears that undertaking a responsible corporate risk analysis
consistent with government regulatory practices may have a modest ef-
fect both on the frequency of punitive damages awards and on the value
of the geometric mean award, reducing both figures. Still, the frequency
and level of the sanctions remained quite substantial even when efforts
were made to explain the nature of the analysis to the jury. Perhaps a
company that successfully justifies its risk analysis as a safety-enhancing
exercise can reduce the likely punitive damage sanctions. The effect is,
however, modest, as jurors still remain willing to award damages. De-
spite the value of risk-cost analyses for obtaining efficient safety out-
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comes, even well-educated jurors fail to reward companies for such ef-
forts.
IV. RULES FOR SETTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
86
The results above suggest that jurors may be more likely to award
punitive damages against companies that perform risk analyses. Given
jurors' failure to use risk analysis evidence constructively, one might ask
whether a much tighter structure imposed on punitive damages awards
could change their behavior. In particular, what if jurors were given ex-
plicit mathematical formulas for setting punitive damages? Such guide-
lines have, in fact, already been proposed in a set of model jury instruc-
tions by Polinsky and Shavell. 7 In this Part of the Article, I report on
results of a study in which I gave subjects a case scenario and asked them
to apply the Polinsky and Shavell damages formulas.
The essence of the Polinsky-Shavell damages approach is that the
total damages should equal the amount of harm divided by the probabil-
ity that this harm will be detected.8 If there is a fifty percent chance that
the harm will be detected, the total penalty should be twice the value of
the damages incurred so that the expected damages borne by the offend-
ing company will equal the level of the harm inflicted. If the harm will be
detected with certainty, then the amount of total damages should equal
the amount of harm, or the compensatory damages amount. Punitive
damages should equal zero. With the Polinsky-Shavell instructions, the
court does not give the jurors the probability of detection; rather, the jury
must assess this parameter. My experimental design simplifies this task
by giving jurors the probability of detection. The basic case scenario in-
volved toxic waste disposal. In order to link this behavior with the Polin-
sky-Shavell formula, the case included an explicit indication of the prob-
ability that the violation would be detected.
In the typical case scenario, the study participant was told that the
Toxic Chemical Research Institute had twelve steel drums of dangerous
chemicals to dispose of before a major production run. The shift manager
was worried about the accumulating chemicals and wanted to find an
easy way to dispose of them. The probabilities of detection of illegal dis-
posal are summarized in the middle column of Table 3. In the first sce-
nario, the company disposed of the chemicals in a nearby stream behind
the plant, realizing that there was a twenty-five percent chance that the
EPA inspector was going to be visiting the plant. Consequently, there was
a seventy-five percent chance that the EPA inspector would not visit the
86 See Viscusi, Challenge of Punitive Damages, supra note 7 for further discussion of
these experimental results.
87 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 7.
aId. at 889.
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plant, and that the company would not be caught. The scenario indicated
that the EPA inspector did identify the spill and that the company was
fined $100,000 to cover water treatment costs. The question was whether
there should be punitive damages and, if so, what amount should be lev-
ied. Under the Polinsky-Shavell approach, the total damages should equal
the total harm divided by the probability of detection, or $100,000 di-
vided by 25%, or four times the economic loss, for a total of $400,000.
Scenario 2 was identical to Scenario 1 except that the detection
probability was 1%. Thus, there was a 99% chance of escaping any pen-
alty. Under the formula, the total damages levied for Scenario 2 should
have been 100 times the economic loss. It should be noted that in Sce-
nario 2, the detection probability is fixed by EPA inspection practices and
cannot be manipulated by the polluter.89
Scenario 3 modified Scenario 2 in terms of the character of the com-
pany's behavior. The company loaded the chemical drums onto unmarked
trucks and dumped the chemicals in a rural stream at 3 a.m. The manager
did this because he hoped that this late-night dumping would reduce the
risk of getting caught. Whereas the company in Scenario 2 also deliber-
ately dumped chemicals in a stream that it knew might be inspected by
the EPA, the low 1% probability of detection was outside of the control
of the polluter. In contrast, in Scenario 3 the low probability of detection
arose because the company engaged in stealthy behavior with the inten-
tion of decreasing the probability of detection. One therefore might ex-
pect the jurors to award higher penalties to punish the polluter's stealth.
Scenario 4 maintained the stealthy disposal assumption from Sce-
nario 3 but added an anchoring factor. The study participants were told
by the plaintiff's attorney that in order to send the company an appropri-
ate signal to be more responsible, there should be a penalty of
$50 million, or about 20% of the company's net worth. The attorney fur-
ther argued that the minimum penalty should be $25 million, and, as a
consequence, the penalty range to be considered by the jury should be
between $25 million and $50 million.90
89 Because full enforcement is costly, agencies generally do not have the resources to
monitor every potential offender on a continuing basis, and detection probabilities will be
less than one.
9 Scenario 4 quoted the plaintiff's attorney:
Your job as jurors is to impose a penalty which will make this corporation, and
others, conduct their business in a way which protects the defenseless citizens of
Texas who have no other way of getting the company to be responsible. This is
your job. A penalty against this company has to be one that they will notice. It
would not destroy this company or even cause them long term financial harm to
impose a penalty on them of $50 million, about 20% of their net worth, or about
two and one-half times their annual profit. Certainly a minimum penalty should
be one year's profit, about $25 million, so the range you may want to consider is
between $25 million, about one year's profit, and $50 million. I don't think that
anything less than $25 million would have much effect as far as deterring them
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Scenario 5 provided similar anchors, though in this case the quoted
damages amount came from a newspaper article indicating that in a
similar case in California, there had been a jury award of $50 million in
punitive damages. The newspaper article also told the jurors that the ap-
peals court reduced this award to $25 million.91
As in the case of the corporate risk analysis experiment, subjects
considered only one of these different scenarios. The total number of
participants in this experiment was 353. Each of the participants was
given the Polinsky-Shavell jury instructions, which ask people to calcu-
late three dollar amounts.92 The first is the deterrence amount, which is
inversely related to the probability of detection.93 To assist in calculating
this figure, Polinsky and Shavell provide a table so that jurors can deter-
mine the damages without any mathematical computation. 94 All partici-
pants in the study received a copy of this table.
The second portion of the instructions tells jurors to calculate a
punishment amount to penalize blameworthy employees at the firm.95
Qualitative guidelines are provided for considering this question, but the
instructions do not give the jurors a punishment formula.96 Jurors are then
asked what amount of punitive damages should be awarded from the
standpoint of punishment. Thus, this formula couples one subjective ele-
ment with other objective components. Moreover, the subjective compo-
nent is firmly grounded in detailed criteria for setting the punishment
value.
The third component of the damages calculation involves finding the
final size of the punitive damages award.9 The instructions indicate that
"[p]unitive damages should be an amount between the amount that you
found appropriate for the purpose of deterrence and the amount that you
found appropriate for the purpose of punishment."98 Thus, the final num-
and getting them to be more careful in their operations.
91 Scenario 5 stated:
Before being placed on the jury you read about a similar case that took place in
California. A jury there fined the company $50 million in punitive damages.
However, the company appealed claiming the award was excessive. The punitive
damages amount was reduced to $25 million by the appeals court in California.
The company claimed that this amount was still too high and that it would con-
tinue to fight the award in court.
92 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 7, at 960.
93 See id. at 960-61.
9 See id. at 962.
95 Id. at 961.
96 For example, the instructions direct jurors to base the punishment amount on
whether the defendant can identify blameworthy employees and whether shareholders or
customers will be impacted negatively by punitive damaged levied on the defendant. Id.
9" See id. at 962.9 8Id.
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ber for the punitive damages should fall between the deterrence value,
which is governed by an explicit mathematical formula, and the punish-
ment value, which is governed by a less precise set of standards.
How well did the jurors adhere to the instructions? The final column
of Table 3 indicates the percentage of respondents who calculated the
deterrence value of punitive damages correctly in view of the Polinsky-
Shavell formula. For Scenario 1, 20% of the respondents correctly ap-
plied the formula, while 80% were unwilling or unable to do so. In the
second scenario, in which the probability of detection was lower and the
total value of damages consequently was boosted substantially according
to the formula, the mock jurors appeared to be less willing to impose the
substantial sanctions. The percentage of jurors who assessed a correct
deterrence value for this scenario dropped to 11%. In contrast, if the be-
havior of the company was described as stealthy, people were more will-
ing to impose the high deterrence punitive damage amounts prescribed
by the formula. The results for Scenario 3 indicate that 21% of the re-
spondents assessed a correct deterrence value.
If the instructions are to be effective, in the real world people must
follow these guidelines rather than extraneous information presented as
part of the case. Scenarios 4 and 5 considered the role of anchoring
through statements by the plaintiff's attorney and information in newspa-
per articles on similar litigation. What we find is that once given these
convenient anchors to latch onto, jurors tended to disregard the Polinsky-
Shavell instructions to an even greater extent than before. Indeed, for
Scenario 4, in which the plaintiff's attorney suggested an anchoring
figure, only 7% of all respondents calculated the deterrence value cor-
rectly. This low statistic is particularly noteworthy because the computa-
tion required only minimal mathematical skills to execute.99 This sug-
gests that factors other than lack of mathematical ability led jurors to
abandon the formula.?0
The levels of damages awarded by the participants in the study are
summarized in Table 4. For the first three scenarios, the damages from
the standpoint of deterrence averaged approximately $3 million to
$4 million, while the punishment values ranged between approximately
$1 million and $6 million. Final award levels for these scenarios were
approximately between $3 million and $6 million.1' 1
99 The damages amount was $100,000 in the case, and with a probability of escaping
liability of 99%, the appropriate multiplier for punitive damages from the Polinsky-Shavell
table is 99, leading to an optimal deterrence value of $9.9 million. Despite the simplicity
of this calculation, 93% of the subjects reported deterrence values other than this correct
amount.
'0 Controlling for personal characteristics and differences in the scenarios, only Sce-
nario 4 exhibits statistically significant differences in terms of the probability of answering
the deterrence questions correctly. See Viscusi, Challenge of Punitive Dam ges, supra note
7, at 339.
lo The fact that Scenario 1 has a higher punishment value than Scenarios 2 and 3 and a
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Matters change substantially when we examine Scenario 4, in which
there was a plaintiff anchoring effect. These anchors increased the deter-
rence value by roughly an order of magnitude from the previous scenar-
ios. Indeed, Scenario 3 was identical to Scenario 4 except for the pres-
ence of the plaintiff's anchor information. Yet, for the deterrence value,
the punishment value, and the final punitive award, the responses for
Scenario 4 were approximately 10 times greater than for Scenario 3.
These effects were almost as strong, but not to the same extent, for Sce-
nario 5.
What these results indicate is that not only do people fail to apply
the deterrence value formula from the Polinsky-Shavell instructions cor-
rectly, but when presented with extraneous information, they do not ap-
pear constrained by the discipline offered by the formula and instead rely
on more convenient anchors that may be either more compelling or easier
to execute. These conclusions do not bode well for the Polinsky-Shavell
instructions' potential to alter juror performance.
The role of anchoring raises the broader issue of whether anchors
should or should not be provided to jurors. Meaningful anchors, such as
those tied to the Polinsky-Shavell formulas, would be more useful than
arbitrary anchors that have the appearance of rigor, but in fact are com-
pletely unrelated to how damages values should be set.
A final pertinent measure of the extent to which the damages in-
structions will be effective is whether people follow the third part of the
instructions. That task is fairly simple, as respondents only have to find a
final punitive damages award between the deterrence value and the pun-
ishment value. If jurors are willing to be disciplined at all by instructions,
then presumably they should be able to follow such simple directions.
Notwithstanding the simplicity of this mathematical task, an average of
only 76% of the respondents were able to come up with a final award
amount that was between their deterrence amount and their punishment
value. The high percentage of jurors who failed in their task suggests that
they may have been straying deliberately from the formula, rather than
failing in its application due to poor math skills.
V. CONCLUSION
These studies send a bleak message to those with the objective of
bringing about more efficient damages awards, because they suggest that
jurors punish careful corporate decision-making on safety issues. Instead
of interpreting risk analyses as evidence that defendants tried to meet
their duty of care, jurors view such studies negatively when awarding
punitive damages. Undertaking a risk analysis may both increase juror
punishment value in excess of the deterrence value seems largely due to the influence of
outliers rather than systematic factors.
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willingness to impose damages and also increase the size of the damages
award. Jurors are unwilling to recognize that corporate risk analyses have
a legitimate role to play and should not subject defendants to additional
sanctions.
Explicit mathematical formulas also fail to induce efficient damages
awards. Despite the straightforward nature of the Polinsky-Shavell in-
structions, most jurors failed to implement them correctly. In fact, many
of the respondents disregarded even the most fundamental aspects of the
instructions, such as the guidance that the total award should lie between
the deterrence and punishment values.
A common theme of these results is that anchoring effects are often
operative. If companies use higher values of life in their risk analyses,
jurors seek to impose even higher levels of damages so as to send a sig-
nal to the corporation regarding their valuation of safety. Thus, compa-
nies that use a higher value of life that reflects a greater concern with
safety may suffer the perverse consequence of increasing rather than de-
creasing their liability.
Not even explicit instructions or mathematical formulas can elimi-
nate anchoring effects. When the plaintiff's attorney or a newspaper ac-
count suggested dollar amounts, the respondents based their damages
awards on these values even though they had been told to follow the pu-
nitive damages instructions. These results highlight the dangers of attor-
neys naming dollar values that may anchor damages assessments on ar-
bitrary amounts.
These findings suggest that there is no simple remedy for changing
juror performance with respect to the award of punitive damages. These
disappointing results do not imply that no effective solution exists. Per-
haps, for example, one could rewrite the jury instructions in such a way
that people would in fact choose to apply them when making their deter-
mination of the damages levels. Whether different sets of instructions
could be implemented properly and would in fact be used by jurors can-
not be determined without testing their performance in an experimental
setting. What we can conclude at this juncture is that the current formu-
lation is ineffective. Neither the Polinsky-Shavell instructions nor evi-
dence of risk analysis enables jurors to focus on the efficiency of dam-
ages awards.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS CASE SCENARIOS
Scenario Risk-Cost Risk Value Cost per Other Case
Analysis of Life Life Saved Components
1 No N/A $4 million -
2 No N/A $1 million -
3 Yes $800,000 $4 million -
4 Yes $3 million $4 million -
5 Yes $3 million $4 million Actual
benefits ex-
ceeded
6 Yes $3 million $4 million Company did
not use
analysis
7 Yes $3 million $4 million Company
based past
improve-
ments on
analysis
2002]
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TABLE 2
CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS CASE RESULTS
Scenario Summary Sample Percent Geometric Median
Description Size Favoring Mean Award
Punitive Award
Damages ($ millions)($ millions)
No analysis, 97 85 3.0 1.0
$4 million
cost per life
2 No Analysis, 97 92 2.9 1.0
$1 million
cost per life
3 Analysis, 97 93 4.0 3.5
$800,000
value of life
4 Analysis, 102 93 5.3 10.0
$3 million
value of life
5 Analysis, 96 95 4.5 10.0
costs over-
estimated
6 Analysis, 104 89 2.5 3.0
did not use
7 Analysis, 102 76 2.1 1.0
past im-
provements
noted
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TABLE 3
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SCENARIOS
Scenario Description Sample Size Percent
Correct
Deterrence
Value
1 .25 detection probability 70 20
2 .01 detection probability 72 11
3 .01 probability, stealthy 72 21
4 .01 probability, stealthy, 70 7
plaintiff anchoring
5 .01 probability, stealthy, 69 14
newspaper anchoring
TABLE 4
AVERAGE DAMAGES VALUES FOR SCENARIOS
($ MILLIONS)
Survey Version Deterrence Punishment Final Punitive
Value Value Award
1 2.9 5.6 5.7
2 3.8 1.4 3.5
3* 3.7 2.4 3.2
4 34.1 29.2 34.8
5 20.1 16.4 22.3
* This sample is trimmed of one outlier who awarded damages in the
billions.
2002]

